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21 From Prejudice Reduction
to Collective Action
Two Psychological Models of Social Change (and How
to Reconcile Them)
John Dixon, Kevin Durrheim, Clifford Stevenson,
and Huseyin Cakal
Even when the social order appears intractable, social change is constantly unfold-
ing all around us, ﬁnding expression in the accumulation of small acts of resistance
as much as in dramatic moments of revolution. Psychologists should take interest in
the dynamics of social change, whether mundane or dramatic, for at least two
reasons. First, the explanation of when and why change occurs – or fails to occur –
requires analysis of ordinary people’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.
To understand fully the conditions under which people act in ways that support
or challenge the status quo, we simply cannot afford to overlook the role of
psychological factors. Second and related, processes of social change invite us to
(re)appraise the moral and political implications of psychological knowledge. How
do we reduce discrimination against others? When do we recognize and challenge
social inequality and when do we accept or even endorse it? How can we create
more inclusive forms of identity and community? Such questions elide the tradi-
tional division between scholarship and advocacy. They require us to demonstrate
how psychological knowledge helps create a more just and tolerant society.
Perhaps less comfortably, they require us to recognize how our discipline may be
complicit in maintaining social inequalities.
In this chapter, we discuss two psychological models of social change, namely
prejudice reduction and collective action. Both models focus on the problem
of “-improving relations between groups to reduce social inequality and
discrimination. However, they propose different psychological pathways to the
achievement of this goal and prioritize different core questions. As we shall see,
the prejudice reduction model primarily addresses the question “How can we get
individuals to like one another more?” whereas the collective action model
primarily addresses the question “How can we get individuals to mobilize
together to challenge inequality?”
The ﬁrst section of the chapter elaborates the fundamental principles and under-
lying assumptions of these models. The second section explores the relationship
between the two models of change, focusing on the allegation that prejudice
reduction exerts counterproductive effects on collective action. The chapter’s
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conclusion advocates a contextualist perspective on social change. We hold that
any evaluation of the efﬁcacy of psychological models of change must remain
sensitive to the “stubborn particulars” (Cherry, 1995) of local conditions and the
affordances and obstacles embedded there.
Prejudice Reduction
How could it be that in a culture of law, order and reason there could have
survived the irrational remnants of ancient racial and religious hatreds? How
to explain the willingness of great masses of people to tolerate the mass
extermination of their fellow citizens.
(Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950, p. v)
Taken from the preface to the Authoritarian Personality, Adorno et al.’s
famous quotation captures some basic features of the modern concept of prejudice.
Initially, this concept highlighted a general distinction between rational thinking
and thinking corrupted by irrational biases. However, in the early years of the last
century, “prejudice” came to refer more narrowly to the expression of unreasonable
dislike toward members of other social groups. In the years following the Second
WorldWar, commentators such as Allport and Kramer (1946), Saenger (1953), and
Allport (1954) gathered compelling evidence of the scale, nature, and conse-
quences of the problem of prejudice, focusing particularly on the damage done
by racism and anti-Semitism in American society. They also presented an unfavor-
able picture of the mental life of bigots, ﬂagging the rigid and “stenciled” quality of
their thinking; their ego fragility and intolerance of ambiguity; and, above all, the
irrational nature of their antipathy for members of minority groups.
This early work often adopted an individual differences approach to explaining
prejudice. It espoused a “rotten apple” perspective (cf. Henriques et al., 1984),
tracing the causes of prejudice to the dynamics of “maladjusted” personality
development. As the ﬁeld developed, alternative causal models gained currency,
and the core image of the nature of the prejudiced person shifted. In the so-called
second phase of prejudice research (cf. Dovidio, 2001), prejudice was viewed as
the unfortunate by-product of ordinary cognitive processes such as categorization,
attribution, and stereotyping. The core image of the authoritarian bigot gave way to
the image of the “cognitive miser,” engaging in efﬁcient yet fallible forms of
information processing. Researchers also recognized increasingly that individual
prejudice might reﬂect group-level norms, identity dynamics, and instrumental
goals rather than personal irrationality (Sherif et al., 1961; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).
In its most recent phase, prejudice research has been dominated by so-called dual
process models, as exempliﬁed, for example, by research that distinguishes
between conscious and implicit attitudes toward others (see Durrheim, Quayle, &
Dixon, 2016). The ﬁgure of the aversive racist – whose surface support for racial
tolerance and equality is offset by unconscious antipathies – shows how this latest
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wave of prejudice research is complicating standard images of the “old-fashioned”
or “redneck” bigot (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004).
One of the most enduring contributions of prejudice research arises from its
implications for promoting social change. From the outset, prejudice researchers
sought not only to understand but also to transform relations of social inequality
and discrimination. As Lippitt and Radke (1946, p. 167) insisted in an early
commentary: “The need for an understanding of the dynamics of prejudice has
no equivalent importance in the social sciences. In no other aspects of interpersonal
and intergroup relations is there a more urgent need for social scientists to get out
and do something [our emphasis].” In the ensuing decades, many social scientists
answered this rallying cry: They got out and did something. Numerous interven-
tions to reduce prejudice were devised, tested, and applied across a wide range of
social and cultural settings and types of intergroup relations (see Paluck & Green,
2009, for a comprehensive overview). Examples include interventions to promote
intergroup contact, common identiﬁcation, empathic awareness, and cooperative
learning.
It is important to acknowledge, of course, that different theoretical conceptions
of the nature of prejudice have inspired different solutions to the problem. If one’s
starting assumption is that the “cognitive processes of prejudiced people are in
general different from the cognitive processes of tolerant people” (Allport, 1954,
p. 170), for example, then this points toward a rather different approach to prejudice
reduction than if one assumes that prejudice reﬂects intergroup competition
for scarce resources (see also Long, 1951). Similarly, if one treats prejudice as
a largely conscious, controlled, and deliberative response, then this has different
implications for practical intervention than if one treats it as an implicit, uncon-
trolled, and automatic response (e.g., Olsen & Fazio, 2006).
Nevertheless, we want to identify some general principles that underlie the entire
project of prejudice reduction, laying the foundations for the model of social
change it promotes. These principles inform researchers’ conception of (a) the
primary agents of change, (b) the primary psychological mechanisms through
which change occurs, and (c) the behavioral changes that ultimately shape broader
patterns of social inequality.
Agents of change. The prejudice reduction model focuses overwhelmingly on
changing the hearts and minds of members of historically advantaged groups,
whose bigotry is viewed as the main cause of social problems such as racism,
xenophobia, and homophobia. Whereas in the early years of the last century, the
victims of social inequality and discrimination were often viewed as bringing
misfortune on themselves (e.g., as a result of intellectual deﬁciencies), the rise of
prejudice research heralded an important and progressive ideological shift
(Samelson, 1978). The prejudices of the historically advantaged increasingly
became viewed as the main problem that required solution. Prejudice reduction
became viewed as the answer to that problem.
Underlying psychological processes. The prejudice reduction model of social
change posits a series of internal cognitive and affective shifts in the mind of the
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bigot. The cognitive shifts enable the prejudiced person to formulate a more
accurate view of social reality and relations or at least to moderate the tendency
to perceive others as mere exemplars of social groups. Stereotype reduction is the
best example this process of “de-biasing,” which typically involves the rational
correction of faulty beliefs about others (see Oakes, Haslam, & Turner (1994) for
a critique of this approach). Early in the history of prejudice research, however,
psychologists realized that stereotype reduction was by no means an automatic
consequence of exposure to counter-stereotypic information. They found that even
in the face of seemingly contradictory evidence, cognitive processes such subtyp-
ing and conﬁrmation bias often preserve stereotypes. They are preserved, too, by
individuals’ emotional investments in maintaining the differences between “us”
and “them.” To echo Allport’s (1954) observation: “Defeated intellectually,” pre-
judice all too often “lingers emotionally” (p. 328).
Proponents of the prejudice reduction model have thus also targeted the trans-
formation of our reactions to others on an emotional level. Whereas the extent to
which prejudice necessarily involves holding false beliefs about others is much
debated, the assumption that it involves disliking them is widely shared. As such,
the challenge of getting people to like one another more – or at least to hate one
another less – lies at the heart of many prejudice reduction interventions. As well as
tackling generalized negativity, such interventions have targeted the reduction of
speciﬁc negative feelings such as anxiety and threat as well as the promotion of
speciﬁc positive feelings such as empathy and forgiveness (e.g., see Pettigrew &
Tropp, 2008).
Behavioral outcomes and their social and political implications. The aim of
prejudice reduction interventions is not merely to get dominant group bigots to
have more positive thoughts and feelings about members of other groups. If this
were the case, then such interventions would have remained an interesting, but
ultimately inconsequential, distraction to the project of combating social inequal-
ity. Rather, the promise on which the voluminous prejudice literature rests is more
provocative and far reaching. It posits the existence of an intimate relationship
between prejudice reduction, transformations in individual behavior, and the
reduction of social inequality on a broader scale.
Proponents of this model do not always make the underlying mechanisms of
change transparent. Indeed, the pathway from psychological to behavioral to
social change is often presumed rather than explicitly evidenced or evaluated.
Nevertheless, it is possible to piece together the assumptions involved, for they
underwrite the promise of psychological work on prejudice. In changing the
thoughts and feelings that the advantaged harbor toward the disadvantaged,
prejudice reduction is also believed to decrease the likelihood that they will
actively discriminate against them in situations that matter, for example, job
interviews, jury deliberations, policing, educational assessments, mortgage-
lending decisions, and so on. In turn, this process is assumed to gradually
erode inequality at a collective and institutional level. Closely related, by
decreasing the likelihood that the historically advantaged will act in ways
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that defend their privileges, prejudice reduction also undermines the so-called
stubborn core of resistance to social change at a societal scale (Dixon et al.,
2010a). It weakens, for instance, resistance to policies such as afﬁrmative
action, educational quotas, and increased taxation of the rich. In these ways,
the psychological rehabilitation of dominant group bigots is believed to med-
iate individual and collective behaviors that promote social change in a broader
sense.
Critics have long harbored doubts about the efﬁcacy of this model of change.
They have warned of the limits of an individualistic account of the origins of
systemic inequality and thus of interventions to promote change through the
improvement of personal thoughts and feelings about others (Henriques et al.,
1984). They have questioned, too, the extent to which we should put our faith in
a model of change that relies on persuading members of advantaged groups to
accept the fundamental injustice of the privileges they enjoy and then to
embrace policies that progressively undermine those privileges (Reicher,
2007). Historical evidence, they have suggested, does not give much cause for
optimism about the success of this strategy. All too often, power is not so much
passively ceded by the advantaged as actively seized by the disadvantaged
(Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012), which brings us to our second
model of social change.
Collective Action
As Owen thought of his child’s future, there sprang up within him a feeling of hatred
and fury against his fellow workmen. They were the enemy – those ragged-trousered
philanthropists, who not only quietly submitted like so many cattle to their miserable
slavery for the beneﬁt of others, but defended it and opposed and ridiculed any
suggestion of reform. They were the real oppressors – the men who spoke of
themselves as “the likes of us”who, having lived in poverty all their lives, considered
that what had been good enough for them was good enough for their children.
(Tressell, 1914, pp. 39–40)
As its name suggests, the collective action model of social change explains
the conditions under which members of a group act together to improve their status,
reduce inequality, or achieve some related group goal. Although the roots of this
model of social change lie outside of psychology – notably in Marxist and socialist
thought and in related sociological and historical work on mass movements –
psychological motivations are central to understanding when and why collective
action occurs, a theme powerfully captured in Robert Tressell’s (1914) socialist
novel The Ragged Trousered Philantropists. In this novel, Tressell details a young
activist’s passionate, and often frustrating, struggle to rouse his fellow workers to
challenge class inequalities in Edwardian England. By presenting a series of
extended conversations between this activist, Frank Owen, and a group of working
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class laborers, Tressell explores the challenges of motivating the historically
disadvantaged to abandon their “philanthropic” acceptance of inequality and act
together to challenge it. At its most basic level, the psychology of collective action
can similarly be characterized as an attempt to understand how “ragged-trousered
philanthropists” become political activists.
We should immediately add that this problem has generated far less attention
than the problem of prejudice reduction within our discipline. Whereas prejudice
reduction has inspired many thousands of studies and attracted millions of dollars
of funding, collective action has been embraced with noticeably less enthusiasm.
Indeed, it could be argued that psychologists have often treated any kind of
rebellious intergroup behavior as inherently dangerous, a perspective captured in
a long tradition of research on crowd psychology (Reicher, 2002). Witness the
scathing indictment of mass behavior presented by Gustave Le Bon, whose work
laid the foundations for modern research on deindividuation accounts of collective
behavior (e.g., Zimbardo, 1969). Submerged within the mass, Le Bon (1896,
pp. 55–56) observed in a notorious passage that individuals tend to display “impul-
siveness, irritability, incapacity to reason, the absence of judgment and of critical
spirit, the exaggeration of the sentiments and others besides – which are almost
always observed in beings belonging to inferior forms of evolution – in women,
savages and children, for instance.”
Notwithstanding this general ideological bias against collective behavior and
mass protest in particular (see also Reicher & Stott, 2011, for a more recent case
study), psychologists have also provided concepts, theories, and evidence that have
enabled the development of the collective action model of social change. Stouffer
and colleagues’ (1949) classic work on relative deprivation shed light on a range of
seemingly paradoxical ﬁndings, laying the foundations for a rich body of research
on the social psychology of intergroup justice (seeWalker & Pettigrew, 1984). This
work showed that objective structural conditions of poverty, mistreatment, and
disadvantage are not in themselves sufﬁcient to explain why people perceive the
social inequality as unfair. Psychological factors such as the nature of social
comparisons made and the degree to which the status quo is perceived as legitimate
play a crucial role. Their work helped explain why, for example, those living in the
worst material circumstances in a society are often not the most dissatisﬁed with
their lot in life.
Tajfel and Turner’s (1986) social identity theory similarly advanced the
ﬁeld by underlining the importance of group identiﬁcation as a driving force
of collective action and clarifying the ideological conditions under which
subordinate groups are likely to band together to challenge the social order.
When group boundaries are perceived as sharply deﬁned and impermeable,
group identities salient, and the social order unstable and illegitimate, they
argued, then collective action to challenge the status quo becomes more
likely. Building on this general theoretical framework, several distinct but
related strands of work on collective action have ﬂourished over the past few
decades. The (elaborated) social identity model of crowd behavior developed
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by Reicher and colleagues (Drury & Reicher, 2009; Reicher, 1982; see also
Stott & Drury, 2000) and the dual pathway model of collective action theory
developed by Van Zomeren and colleagues (Van Zommeren, Postmes &
Spears, 2008, Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004) exemplify
two exciting developments in the ﬁeld. Klandermans and colleagues’ work
on the psychology of protests and the role of politicized collective identities
exempliﬁes another (Klandermans, 1997, 2002; Simon & Klandermans,
2001).
Our concern in this chapter is not with the details of speciﬁc theories of collective
action. Rather, as in our discussion of prejudice reduction, we want to outline some
general principles that inform this model of social change. These principles again
specify (a) the main agents of change, (b) the main psychological mechanisms
through which change occurs, and (c) the individual and collective behaviors that
are presumed to alter wider patterns of social inequality.
Agents of change. Although its proponents do not deny that members of
historically advantaged groups may participate in mass protest, the collective
action model has generally focused on the role of the disadvantaged in promoting
social change. There are at least two good reasons for this focus. First, the
disadvantaged typically have less access to institutional sources of power and
must therefore rely to a far greater degree on the power of mass resistance to effect
change. Second, given that many social struggles are designed to undermine
systems of hierarchy and privilege, the disadvantaged typically have most to gain
from collective action.
Underlying psychological processes. As anticipated earlier, the collective
action model of social change focuses on psychological processes that encourage
individuals to recognize injustice and become motivated to do something about it.
A number of key processes are consistently identiﬁed in the literature, uniting
otherwise distinct theoretical traditions (see also Simon&Klandermans, 2001; Van
Zommeren et al., 2008). First, a strong sense of social identity is generally agreed to
be critical. When individuals perceive themselves as belonging to a common social
category and feel an emotional attachment to that category, then collective action is
more likely to occur. Conversely, the experience of engagement in collective action
may itself lead to strong stronger identiﬁcation with the group or even a redeﬁnition
of participants” self-deﬁnitions (cf. Drury & Reicher, 2000). Second and related,
collective action is often impelled by perceptions of injustice about the treatment of
a common ingroup. Of particular signiﬁcance here are perceptions that arise
through intergroup comparisons in which the relative social statuses of “us” and
“them” are directly contrasted, fomenting what Runciman (1966) called a sense of
“fraternalistic deprivation.” Third, this typically leads to negative emotions such as
anger, frustration, and outrage, which are arguably the most immediate predictors
of participation in collective action. Fourth, such action also becomes more likely
when the social order is perceived as unstable and when group members develop
a sense of collective efﬁcacy and empowerment. Again, the act of participating in
mass protest can in itself be an empowering and transformative experience.
From Prejudice Reduction to Collective Action 487
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As Drury and Reicher (2009) note, when participation is “understood as instantiat-
ing one’s collective identity over against one’s oppressors, then empowerment can
develop into a virtuous cycle of broader, deeper, and more advanced resistance”
(p. 722).
Behavioral outcomes and their social and political implications. Collective
action can take many forms and ﬁnd expression in different kinds of behaviors.
The anti-apartheid struggle, for instance, was marked by mass strikes that sought
to cripple the apartheid economy, marches protesting particular apartheid laws,
and violent clashes with the South African police in the townships. In an espe-
cially imaginative expression of collective resistance during the 1980s, black
protesters drew attention to the injustice (not to mention ridiculousness) of beach
segregation by staging a campaign of occupations under the banner “All God’s
beaches for all God’s people.” In this case, mass protests took the form of
picnicking on Whites-only beaches and taking rebellious dips in Whites-only
seas (Durrheim & Dixon, 2001).
Research on collective action has attempted to catalog its various forms and to
map its social, psychological, and political implications. Psychological work, for
example, has distinguished between normative and nonnormative, violent and
nonviolent, and incidental and sustained collective action (e.g., see Tausch et al.,
2011). It has shown how the psychological pathways that lead to different forms of
collective action may vary, even if many of the core processes are similar. Our key
point here, however, is not to open up these complexities. We want to make
a simpler observation. Collective action is not about getting (psychologically
reformed) individuals to treat other individuals better in the hope that this may
indirectly change the status quo. Rather, it is about getting members of disadvan-
taged communities to act together to challenge the status quo directly, that is, to
become a group not only of but also for itself.
Whether or not this process is ultimately effective, of course, is a moot point, and
one that its champions sometimes gloss over. Mass protests can result in violent
repressions that intensify inequality and leave the disadvantaged in a deteriorating
rather than improving situation. The availability of personal and collective
resources, effective communication and coordination structures, the capacity to
form allegiances with third parties, the political/military power, and unity of
opposition forces can all play a vital role in determining the success of any social
struggle. Moreover, mass protest may also lead to unanticipated consequences in
which, for example, the overthrow of one repressive regime creates the conditions
under which another can form.
Similarly, the idea that members of disadvantaged groups who view the social
order as legitimate or believe that social mobility is possible can necessarily be
characterized as holding a distorted view of social reality has attracted criticism.
For one thing, it disregards the fact that the disadvantaged may have sound reasons
for embracing the status quo under certain conditions. For instance, an unequal
social system may present short-term material beneﬁts and opportunities that
a disadvantaged community may be quite right to recognize, especially if the viable
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alternatives are not present. For one thing, it begs the questions of who is in
a position to deﬁne objectively the nature and causes of social inequality or judge
the validity others’ political beliefs. Debates surrounding the Marxist concept of
ideological “false consciousness” and of the entire “dominant ideology” thesis
(Abercrombie & Turner, 1978) highlight some of the complexities involved here.
They also offer an intriguing, if as yet relatively unexplored, counterpoint to
psychological work that emphasizes the tendency of subordinate group members
to accept their own subordination.
Relationship Between the Two Models of Change
It is intuitive to presuppose that our twomodels of social change, prejudice
reduction and collective action, inform complementary interventions to promote
social change. On the one hand, prejudice reduction works by tackling the cogni-
tive and emotional biases of members of dominant groups and, in so doing,
reducing their tendency to discriminate against members of subordinate groups.
On the other hand, collective action works by mobilizing the disadvantaged to
challenge social inequality from the bottom up. In this way, these models of change
could be seen as mutually sustaining movements within a common process of
creating social justice.
In a provocative series of book chapters, however, Steve Wright and his
colleagues have complicated this simple story (e.g., see Wright, 2001; Wright &
Baray, 2012; Wright & Lubensky, 2009), opening up a new tradition of research on
the so-called ironic (Dixon et al., 2010b) or sedative (Cakal, Hewstone, Schwar, &
Heath, 2011) effects of prejudice reduction on collective action. They argue that the
surface complementarity of these models belies deeper social psychological – and
indeed political – tensions that may ultimately prove irreconcilable.
Prejudice reduction increases positive intergroup emotions and beliefs, while
decreasing negative reactions to members of other groups. Prejudice reduction
lessens the salience of intergroup boundaries and their associated social identities
and thus weakens processes of intergroup comparison and differentiation. Above
all, prejudice reduction fosters harmonious relations between hitherto divided and
unequal communities. It does so both by correcting negative beliefs about the
disadvantaged and by extending the emotional good will of the advantaged toward
those who are less fortunate than themselves. Like a pebble thrown into a pond, its
effects are assumed to ripple outward gently to transform intergroup relations at an
institutional and collective level.
By contrast, as Table 21.1 highlights, collective action sets in motion an oppos-
ing set of social and psychological processes. Rather than diminishing intergroup
comparisons and decreasing the salience of group identities, collective action
typically requires the disadvantaged to identify strongly as a social group and to
make intergroup comparisons that highlight social inequalities. Collective action
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works by fostering rather than reducing ostensibly negative emotions, especially
a sense of anger at the status quo, which provides the psychological impetus to act
collectively. Above all, collective action works not by fostering harmony, but by
enabling confrontation with existing relations of power and status: a process that
typically brings the historically disadvantaged into direct conﬂict with representa-
tives (or functionaries) of the historically advantaged.
These tensions between a model of change based on promoting intergroup
harmony and a model of change based on promoting intergroup conﬂict play out
not only at a psychological but also at a sociopolitical level. A growing body of
research has suggested that prejudice reduction interventions may well be effective
at improving the thoughts and feelings that the disadvantaged espouse toward the
advantaged. However, they also reduce their tendency to acknowledge, reject, or
challenge social inequality and this may have profound consequences for whether
or not social change occurs (Dixon et al., 2012).
Consider, for example, emerging work on the consequences of intergroup con-
tact (see Tropp, Mazziotta, & Wright, Chapter 20, this title) – one of the most
extensively researched interventions to reduce prejudice. By increasing intergroup
empathy, decreasing intergroup anxiety, and providing richer information about
others, contact has been shown to improve intergroup attitudes, reduce negative
stereotypes, and increase positive responses such as forgiveness and trust (see
Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011, for a comprehensive review). For this reason, the contact
hypothesis (Allport, 1954) has “long been considered one of psychology’s most
effective strategies for improving intergroup relations” (Dovidio, Gaertner, &
Kawamaki, 2003, p. 5).
Mounting evidence suggests, however, that positive experiences of contact with
the advantaged can have paradoxical effects on the political attitudes and collective
action orientations of the disadvantaged (see Dixon et al., 2010c, for a review).
Table 21.1 Two models of social change
Model of Change
Main Agents of
Change Interventions
Psychological
Processes
Behavioral
Outcomes
Prejudice
reduction model
Members of
historically
advantaged
groups
Intergroup contact;
cooperative
interdependence;
reeducation;
empathy arousal
Stereotype reduction;
more positive affect;
decreased salience of
group boundaries
and identities
Reduction of
individual acts of
discrimination;
reduction of
intergroup conﬂict
Collective action
model
Members of
historically
disadvantaged
groups
Empowerment;
consciousness
raising; coalition
building
Sense of injustice;
collective anger;
collective efﬁcacy;
increased salience of
group boundaries
and identities
Collective action
to change the
status quo
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This evidence has been gathered from research conducted in the United States
(Glasford & Calcagno, 2011; Tropp, Hawi, van Laar, & Levin 2012; Taush, Saguy,
& Bryson, in press), South Africa (Cakal, 2011; Dixon et al., 2007, 2010b), Israel
(Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio & Pratto, 2009; Saugy & Chernyak-Hai, 2012), India
(Tausch, Saguy, & Singh, 2009), and New Zealand (Sengupta & Sibley, 2013).
It has used an array of research designs, types of intergroup relations, and political
indicators relevant to collective action; and it has produced a broadly convergent
set of ﬁndings (see also Tropp et al., Chapter 20, this titile).
These ﬁndings indicate that positive intergroup contact reduces subordinate
group members’
• Support for policies designed to redress inequality (e.g., Sengupta & Sibley,
2013)
• Readiness to perceive the members of the ingroup as suffering from collective
discrimination (e.g., Dixon et al., 2010b)
• Feelings of anger at unjust treatment (e.g., Tausch et al., in press)
• Political solidarity with members of similarly disadvantaged groups (e.g.,
Glasford & Calcagno, 2011)
• Most important, willingness to participate in collective action to change social
inequality (e.g., Becker et al., 2013; Cakal et al., 2011; Tropp et al., 2012; Saguy
et al., 2009)
At the same time, such contact increases subordinate group members’
• Willingness to perceive the existing status hierarchy as legitimate (e.g., Saguy
et al., 2009)
• Belief in the possibility of social mobility (e.g., Tausch et al., 2015)
• Readiness to perceive that members of the dominant groups will treat members
of subordinate groups fairly (e.g., Saguy & Chernyak-Hai, 2012)
Explaining the pathway from positive contact to collective action, researchers
such as Cakal et al. (2011), Tausch et al. (2015), Tropp et al. (2012) and Wright &
Lubensky (2009) present evidence that positive interactions with the advantaged
tend to reduce disadvantaged group members’ perceptions of injustice, identiﬁca-
tion with the ingroup, sense that group boundaries are “closed” and that social
mobility is difﬁcult, and anger at injustice. These psychological shifts in turn
reduce their willingness to support, or participate in, collective action (see also
Tropp et al., Chapter 20, this title).
Of course, this process varies depending on the nature of contact experiences.
Contact in which intergroup relations of power and status are explicitly ﬂagged
(Becker et al., 2013) or where encounters are negatively experienced by
subordinate group members (cf. Barlow et al., 2012) may prove to be exceptions.
However, given that contact interventions generally seek to promote harmonious
exchanges – and that dominant group members are often motivated to keep issues
of power and status off the table during intergroup encounters (Saguy & Dovidio,
2013) – the paradoxical effects of contact on minority political attitudes arguably
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illustrate deep-lying tensions between models of social change based on prejudice
reduction and models based on collective action (see Dixon et al., 2012, for further
discussion).
Echoing this idea, researchers working in other ﬁelds of inquiry have warned that
exploitative intergroup relations are often characterized not by overt antipathy, but
by mixed or even ostensibly positive emotions and behaviors. Jackman’s (1994)
sociological work has shown how many long-standing systems of intergroup
inequality (e.g., gender relations in patriarchal societies) are swathed in the “coer-
cive embrace” of paternalistic affection, which has a “shimmering allure” for
members of both advantaged and disadvantaged groups alike. Similarly, emerging
psychological research on benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 2001), common
identiﬁcation (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009), positive dehumanization
(Haslam & Loughnan, 2012), and even intergroup helping (Durrheim, Jacobs, &
Dixon, 2014; Nadler, 2002) demonstrates how negative evaluations need not
underpin the problem of social inequality.
A ﬁortori, getting people to like one another more is not necessarily the solution
(Dixon et al., 2012). Indeed, in some circumstances at least, prejudice reduction
and other interventions to promote social harmony may actually make social
change more difﬁcult to achieve. As Wright and Baray (2012) emphasize:
Although it is clear efforts to reduce rampant antipathy, overt expressions of
hostility, and active denigration of other groups would need to be part of
a scheme to improve many intergroup relations, it also appears reasonable to
consider the limitations of a focus on prejudice reduction, and recognize that it
may actually directly conﬂict with another important means by which positive
social change occurs – collective action. Failure to recognize these limitations
will very likely lead us into the trap that many members of the advantage group
seem to fall into – assuming that because interpersonal interactions across
groups are convivial and warm that intergroup inequalities are either gone or are
acceptable. (p. 242)
Conclusion: Toward a Contextualist Resolution
William McGuire (1983) once advocated what he called a contextualist
approach to social psychology (later elaborated into his perspectivist approach).
Two of the guiding principles of his approach are particularly apposite to our
discussion of models of social change in this chapter. First, any social psychologi-
cal theory will beneﬁt from empirical confrontation across as wide a range of
contexts and everyday settings as possible. Crucially, this enables not only its
falsiﬁcation but also, equally important, the speciﬁcation of its boundary condi-
tions. The second principle is a corollary of the ﬁrst. Social psychologists should
actively seek out conditions where their theoretical models and associated hypoth-
eses do not seem to apply; that is, where predicted effects and relationships are
weaker, nonexistent, or even reversed. Increasingly, we have come to view the
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tensions between collective action and prejudice reduction models of social change
in such contextualist terms. The resolution of these tensions will not, in our view,
involve a generic denouement. Rather, it will involve careful, qualiﬁed, and con-
textually attuned work that appraises the social, political, and psychological oppor-
tunities – and obstacles – to social change within and across a range of social
contexts. In the spirit of McQuire, we end the chapter by considering two contexts
in which the efﬁcacy of collective action and prejudice reduction interventions to
promote social change might well vary.
The ﬁrst context is post-apartheid South Africa, a society where the ﬁrst
and second authors of this chapter have conducted research for more than 20
years. Most of this research has explored the relationship between intergroup
contact and attitudes toward the transformation of structures of racial inequality
in the post-apartheid era. In a series of national surveys, for example, we
found that Black South Africans who reported having positive contact with
White South Africans tended to have more favorable intergroup attitudes (as
measured on dimensions such as trust and warmth). At the same time, such
contact was associated with lower levels of support for government policies
designed to address inequality, such as land restitution and afﬁrmative action
(Dixon et al., 2007).
In a follow-up study, we found that positive contact with Whites was also
associated with decreased acknowledgment of racial discrimination among
Black South Africans (Dixon et al., 2010b). Intriguingly, we found that these
effects were partly mediated by (positive) intergroup attitudes. When the
disadvantaged hold positive feelings toward members of a historically advan-
taged group, our analysis suggested, then it becomes more difﬁcult for them to
treat the advantaged as beneﬁciaries of inequality. Consequently, they may be
less motivated to act in ways that challenge the status quo. This may help
explain why paternalistic relationships – marked by ostensibly affectionate and
helpful intergroup exchanges – can play an insidious role in maintaining
existing power relations in post-apartheid society (see Durrheim, Jacobs, &
Dixon, 2014, for a case study).
Based on these and similar ﬁndings, we have come to question the limits of the
prejudice reduction model that has dominated psychological research on social
change for most of the past century. Indeed, we have contributed to emerging
debates about the limits of what Wetherell and Potter (1992) once called the
“prejudice problematic” (e.g., Dixon et al., 2012). We have argued that the entire
project of “getting us to like one another more” is sometimes a distraction from the
main struggle to achieve social inequality. Worse, by diminishing the extent
to which the historically disadvantaged recognize and resist broader forms of
injustice, this project may sometimes contribute to the very problem that it is trying
resolve.
It is important, however, to ﬂag the boundary conditions within which this
critique of the prejudice reduction model of social change applies. Our work has
focused almost exclusively on relations within a society marked by long-standing,
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continuing, institutionalized patterns of racial discrimination: a society where
absolute and relative levels of poverty make it one of the most unequal countries
on earth. In this society, Black citizens continue to struggle for access to basic
health care, education, employment, and housing; their life expectancy, health,
wealth, and opportunities for social mobility are grossly diminished as a result.
In this society, too, the project of creating racial harmony through prejudice
reduction is, in our view, of limited relevance to the promotion of social equality,
at least at the present historical juncture. Indeed, it is worth noting that many of the
signiﬁcant political advances achieved in South Africa over the past 25 years,
including the dismantling of apartheid, have largely been the result of sustained
collective action – often in the face of violent repression – by the disadvantaged and
their allies. They have had little or nothing to do with the improvement of the racial
attitudes and stereotypes of White South Africans.
To say this is not to claim that prejudice reduction is intrinsically ﬂawed,
however, or to deny it has value in certain circumstances. To the contrary, in
circumstances where social equality has been broadly achieved, prejudice reduc-
tion can be effective in combatting some of the other legacies that affect social life
in post-conﬂict societies. The program of work conducted by Miles Hewstone, the
late Ed Cairns, and their colleagues in Northern Ireland evidences some of the
potential beneﬁts of prejudice reduction in a society where signiﬁcant advances
have been made in terms of the achievement of social justice, but where problems
of intergroup conﬂict linger (e.g., Hewstone et al., 2006).
Although Northern Ireland has a long history of (sectarian) discrimination and
inequality, in the years following the end of “The Troubles,”much has been done to
address its legacy. Major advances have been made, for example, in terms of key
issues of political representation and the reform of institutions of policing and
criminal justice. Moreover, although poverty and disadvantage certainly exist in
Northern Ireland, they are neither as severe as the South African situation nor,
crucially, are they structured so overwhelmingly along intergroup lines. Many of
Northern Ireland’s current problems relate to issues of fear and distrust between
Protestant and Catholic communities, persistently high levels of segregation, con-
ﬂict over the expression of cultural differences, and of course the ever present threat
of sectarian violence. This threat creates numerous problems at the level of every-
day life.
Bairner and Shirlow (2003) demonstrated, for instance, how use of public
facilities designed to beneﬁt the whole community (e.g., leisure centers) may be
curtailed by fears about where they are located. Protestants are often reluctant to
use facilities located in our near Catholic areas, while Catholics are similarly
reluctant to use facilities located in or near Protestant areas.
In this kind of context, as Hewstone and colleagues’ work demonstrates power-
fully, prejudice reduction interventions such as promoting intergroup contact are of
potentially vital importance (e.g., Hewstone et al., 2006; Hughes et al., 2008). They
have the capacity to increase empathy and forgiveness across intergroup divisions,
reduce the dehumanization of others, dampen intergroup threat and anxiety, and
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thus improve how individuals treat one another in everyday settings. Ultimately, as
is happening in Northern Ireland, they may inform government initiatives to
promote good relations and to create urban environments where citizens feel
safe, trusting of one another, and able to mingle freely.
Our broader point is that the formulation “prejudice reduction versus collec-
tive action” is potentially as limiting as the presumption that the two models of
change are simply compatible. The deeper challenge will be to explore how the
relationship between these two models of change plays out within particular
social contexts and to specify the conditions under which interventions based
on these models are effective, ineffective, or even counterproductive in creat-
ing a more just society.
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